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                          1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This paper analyses a situation where a final good industry (which I 
call paper industry) uses input good (which I call wood) produced by 
an upstream industry (which I call forestry). Wood flow production is a 
constant share of forest reserves. There is no depreciation of these 
reserves. Investment increases the effective size of reserves. In 
forestry there is congestion. This is presented as increasing investment 
cost with respect to reserves. A representative forest owner- wood 
producer maximizes her intertemporal utility subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint. Paper industry is competitive while 
forestry may be competitive or non- competitive. The model applied is 
chosen so that special consequences of non-competitiveness can be 
brought forth. In a competitive situation there is no transitional 
dynamics. If there is an increase in wood demand the forest-owner 
adjusts instantaneously reserves to the desired long-run level. In 
contrast, if the forest-owner's supply affects wood price and she 
perceives it, this adjustment is gradual. For this, I will deal with two 
cases. In the first, the forest-owner has monopoly in wood selling 
while in the second I use a more general formulation. 
 
 
The model is presented in Sec. 2. Basically, it may be seen as a special 
case of a more general situation with upward and downward industries 
with emphasis on the former. Analytically, my model has similarities to 
those presented, e.g., by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch.2.4.) or 
Sen and Turnovsky (1991). In their models transitional dynamics is 
generated by investment installation costs which increase with respect 
to the size of investment flow or to relative size of investment to 
capital in competitive circumstances with decreasing returns to scale 
technology. For comparison, in my model there is constant returns to 
scale in production and transitional dynamics is generated by 
imperfect competition.  
 
 
After presenting the model, long-run consequences are discussed in 
Section 3 while transitional dynamics is presented in Section 4. Based 
on these,  indebtedness and wealth effects are analyzed in Section 5. 
Concluding remarks are in Section 6. 
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                   2. THE MODEL 
 
 
Wood is produced in forests owned by a representative forest owner-
wood producer. The effective size of these forests is denoted by R 
which will be called (forest) reserves. These reserves yield wood at a 
constant rate σ, that is, there is a continuous flow of wood σR(t) where 
t denotes time. Variable wood production costs (paid to outsiders) are 
assumed equal to zero. Investment, I, increases reserves and is 
financed by borrowing and/or from retained earnings. There is no 
depreciation of reserves. Installation costs of investments increase 
with the size of R. A simple formulation of this is to assume that the 
total costs of investing I is (1+h(R))I, h' > 0. The forest owner 
maximizes her intertemporal utility depending on her consumption c. 
She may take loans from a fully functioning credit market at a 
constant interest rate i*. Her subjective discount rate is equal to this.  
Her indebtedness at time t is B(t). All in all, her optimization may be 
presented as 
 
                     ∞                     
             max ∫u(c(t))e -i*tdt                                      (1) 
                    0                       
 
subject to 
 
                  dB/dt=   i*B + c +  (1+h(R))I - wσR            (2a) 
 
                  dR/dt = I                                                 (2b) 
 
 
where u denotes instantaneous utility, u’> 0, u’’< 0 and w denotes 
wood price. In a competitive situation wood price is exogenous. In a 
non-competitive situation I analyze two cases, a monopoly in selling 
wood and a more general formulation.  For monopoly, we need 
demand for wood. A simple formulation is to assume that a 
representative final-good firm produces according to a variant of Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
 
 
               F =  A(σR)
ß
   , 0 < ß < 1                                 (3) 
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The constant A can be understood as a measure of paper production 
efficiency. For simplicity, we set final good's other production costs 
than those caused by buying wood equal to zero. In this situation the 
firm’s profit is pA(σR)
ß
 - wσR where p denotes paper price. p is 
assumed exogenous. It may, for example, be equal to paper's world 
market price. Maximizing this profit with respect to wood input σR 
yields the inverse demand function for wood as 
 
 
             w = pAß(σR)
-(1-ß)
                               (4)                                                                               
 
 
The more general non- competitive situation may be presented so that 
wood price is a decreasing function of wood supply which is, for its 
part, a function of reserves, that is, w = f(σR) = w(R) where w' < 0, 
w'' < 0. 
 
 
 
For forest owner’s optimization, the Hamiltonian is: 
 
                                                                                      
          H =  {u(c)- µ [i*B + c + (1+h(R))I - wσR]  + µqI} e
-i*t       
(5)
   
 
 
     
The control variables are c and I while B and R are state variables. The 
co- state variables are   -µ(t)e
-i*t
 for  debt accumulation and  
µ(t)q(t)e
-i*t 
 for reserve accumulation. Three first degree optimum 
conditions are the same for non-competitive and competitive 
situations: 
 
 
          u’(c(t)) = µ(t)                (from dH/dc = 0)         (6a) 
 
          1+h(R) = q           (from dH/dI = 0 )                 (6b) 
 
          d(-µe
-i*t
)/dt = - (∂H/∂B) = µi*e
-i*t
                    (6c) 
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The fourth condition for a non- competitive situation where forest  
owner has monopoly in selling wood  is, by inserting Eq.(4) into (5), 
 
 
           d [µqe
-i*t 
] /dt     = -(∂H/∂R)  
                  (6d) 
                 = µ [ - pAß
2
σ
ß
 R
ß-1  + h'(R)I ] e
-i*t
 
 
 
 
For the more general formulation, inserting w = w(R) into (5) yields as 
the fourth condition the following: 
 
 
            d [µqe
-i*t 
] /dt   = µ [ - wσ  - w' σR  + h'(R)I ] e
-i*t  
 (6d') 
 
 
 
In a competitive situation, the condition is:  
 
 
             d [µqe
-i*t 
] /dt    = µ [ - wσ   
 
+  h'(R)I ] e
-i*t  
 (6d'') 
 
 
 
where w is exogenous. Additionally, it can be shown that transversality 
conditions are fulfilled in all cases. 
 
 
 
From Eq. (6c), dµ/dt = 0 or µ is constant. Because the utility function 
u is decreasingly increasing, we may conclude from Eq. (6a) that 
consumption is the same for all t, that is, there is a complete 
consumption smoothing. Denoting the steady state values by 
asterisks, noticing from Eq. (2b) that I* = 0 and applying Eq. (2a) 
consumption may be presented as 
 
 
                c(t) = c*  =    w*σR* - i*B*        (7) 
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Differentiating Eq. (6b) with respect to q we may see that Rq > 0 and 
from this that Iq > 0. Using dµ/dt = 0 and Eq. (6c) we obtain from Eq. 
(6d), in the monopoly case, 
 
         
            dq/dt = i*q -  pAß
2
σ
ß
 R
ß-1 
  +  h'(R)I       (8) 
 
 
 
In the more general formulation of non-competitive market, from Eq. 
(6d'), 
 
 
 
           dq/dt = i*q   - wσ - w'σR  
 
  +  h'(R)I   (8') 
 
                    
 
In a competitive situation this is, by setting w' = 0, 
 
 
 
             dq/dt   = i*q    - wσ  + h’(R)I    (8’') 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          3. LONG RUN EFFECTS 
 
 
 
 
In the monopoly case, Eqs. (8) and (6b) yield in the steady state  
 
 
    i*q*  =  pAß
2
σ
ß
 R*
ß-1 
  =  ßw*σ = i*(1+h(R*))            (9)                                               
 
 
 
 7 
As may be concluded from Eq.(9) in the steady state marginal revenue 
from resources is equal to their marginal interest cost. For the more 
general formulation, from Eqs. (8') and (6b), 
 
 
     i*q*  =   w*σ + w'(R*)σR* 
  
   = i*(1+h(R*))              (9') 
 
 
 
The competitive case is straightforward because here w' = 0. From 
(9'), 
 
 
        i*q*  =     wσ   
 
= i*(1+h(R*))                        (9’') 
 
 
Notice that the same condition (9'') would be obtained by choosing 
resources so that the discounted net profits would be maximized, that 
is, from maximizing the following with respect to R*: 
 
 
               ∞                                  R* 
             ∫wσR*e-i*t dt    -       ∫ (1 + h(R))dR                     
             0                                    R0         
 
 
where the last term presents the costs of the instantaneous increase in 
reserves by R* - R0. 
 
 
In all three cases the steady state value of q, the shadow price of 
resources, is equal to cost of the last unit of new reserves, that is, q* 
= 1+h(R*). Comparing Eq. (9'') with Eq. (9) or (9') we see that with 
imperfect competition optimal long-run resources are smaller than in 
the competitive case. Additionally, the right hand side of Eq. (9’') 
shows that the interest cost of the last additional unit of forest is equal 
to the revenue obtained from it. 
 
 
In the monopoly case we obtain from Eq. (9) the effects of two 
potential sources of an increase in wood demand, an improvement in 
paper production efficiency and an increase in paper price, as 
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   ∂R*/∂A = pß2σßR*ß-1/[i*h'(R*) + pAß2(1-ß)σßR*-(2-ß)] >  0 (10a) 
 
     ∂R*/∂p = Aß
2
σ
ß
 R*
ß-1
/[i*h'(R*)+ pAß
2
(1-ß)σ
ß
R*
-(2-ß)
] >  0 (10b) 
 
 
 
Both lead to an increase in long-run reserves. Correspondingly, with 
the more general formulation, the effect of an autonomous upward 
shift in wood price, for whatever reason, is obtained by differentiating 
(9') as 
 
 
         ∂R*/∂w =   σ / [-w''σR*- w'σ +i*h'(R*)]              (11) 
 
 
which is positive because w', w'' < 0 and h' > 0. An autonomous 
increase in wood price leads to an increase in long-run reserves. 
Finally, as may be seen from (11), in the competitive case,  
 
         
             ∂R*/∂w =   σ / [i*h'(R*)] >  0       (12) 
 
            
 
An increase in wood price leads to an increase in long-run reserves of 
forests. Comparing Eqs. (12) and (11) we may conclude that the 
reserves' increase is larger in the competitive situation than in the 
non-competitive situation. 
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            4. SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
 
 
 
 
The system may be seen as functions of two variables, R and q. It is 
solved in a standard way by starting from Equations (2b) and  (8) or 
(8') or (8''). Linearizing the non-linear functions around the steady 
state values R* and q* yields 
 
 
   dR/dt  = Iq(q*)(q-q*)                                    (13a) 
 
 
   dq/dt   =  i*q  - pAß
2
σ
ß
 R*
-(1-ß) 
+ pA(1-ß)ß
2
 σ
ß 
R*
-(2-ß)
 [R-R*] 
 
                   + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*] (13b) 
 
or 
 
 
    dq/dt   =  i*q  -  w*σ - w'(R*)σR* 
 
- [2w'(R*)σ + w''(R*)σR*][R-R*] 
 
                   + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*]                       (13b') 
 
 
or 
 
 
     dq/dt   =  i*q   - wσ  + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*] (13b’') 
 
 
 
(13b) refers to the monopoly case, (13b') to the more general case 
and Eq. (13b’') to the competitive case. These equations may be 
presented in matrix form as:                  
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     dR/dt                0           Iq(q*)          R             constant 
   |           |    =  |                           |   |       |  +  |              |    (14) 
     dq/dt                E             G               q             constant 
 
 
 
where, in the monopoly situation,  E = pA(1-ß)ß
2
 σ
ß 
R*
-(2-ß)
 > 0 and 
G = i*+Iqh'(R*) > 0. In the more general case, E = - [2w'(R*)σ + 
w''(R*)σR*] > 0. Notice that these constants may differ between the 
cases. When solving these two simultaneous differential equations, 
one of the characteristic roots is negative, equal to v = [G - (G
2 + 
4IqE)
1/2
]/2, and the other is positive and equal to [G + 
(G
2
+4IqE)
1/2
]/2. Accordingly, we have saddle-path dynamics in the 
non-competitive cases.  Applying Eq. (9'') Eq. (13b'') shows that in a 
competitive situation E = 0 which implies that the characteristic root v 
is zero and that there is no transitional dynamics. Reserves jump 
instantaneously to the steady state level. 
 
 
  
In the non-competitive cases, the optimal path is the stable branch of 
the saddle-paths. Applying Eqs. (9) or (9') into Eqs. (13) or (13') a 
particular solution of these simultaneous differential equations turns 
out to be q(t) = q* , R(t) = R*  and so we obtain the time path of R 
as: 
 
 
                R(t) = R* + (R0 - R*)e
vt
                                     (15) 
 
 
where R0  is the initial reserves.  Eq. (15) shows the gradual growth of 
reserves to their new steady state size caused, for  example, by paper 
price increase. Differentiating Eq. (15) and inserting it into Eq. (14a) 
yields the corresponding optimal path for q, the shadow price of 
reserves, as 
 
 
    q(t) =  q* + (v/Iq)(R0 - R*)e
vt
  = q* + (v/Iq)(R(t) - R*)  (16) 
 11 
 
                  5. DEBT AND WEALTH 
 
 
 
 
In the non-competitive cases, using Eqs. (4), (6b), (7), (15) and (16) 
in Eq. (2a) and linearizing  we obtain the following first-order 
differential equation for monopoly and for the more general case (see 
Appendix): 
 
 
        dB/dt = i*B – i*B* + [q*v -  ßp*σ](R0 - R*)e
vt          
(17) 
 
 
 
       dB/dt  = i*B - i*B* + [q*v - w*σ - w'(R*)σR*](R0 - R*)e
vt 
  (17') 
 
 
 
Solving these yields, applying Eqs. (9) or (9')   
 
 
        B(t) = B*  +  Ω[ R0 – R*] e
vt
 = B*  +  Ω [ R(t) – R*]   (18) 
 
 
 
where Ω = q* = 1+h(R*) > 1. We may see that forest owner's debt 
increases in the same way as the reserves increase. Differentiating Eq. 
(18) yields, for the monopoly case, 
 
 
          ∂B*/∂p = Ω [∂R*/∂p]     > 0                                     (19a) 
 
 
          ∂B*/∂A = Ω [∂R*/∂A]      >  0                                  (19b) 
 
      
 
For the more general formulation and for the competitive case we 
obtain, for an autonomous increase in wood price, 
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         ∂B*/∂w = Ω [∂R*/∂w]                                              (19c) 
 
 
As can be seen, in all cases the long-run indebtedness of the forest 
owner increases proportionately to the long-run reserves increase. 
For the competitive case, the adjustment is straightforward: reserves 
increase instantaneously to the long-run level. This is entirely financed 
by increased debt. 
 
 
From Eq. (18) B* - B(0) = Ω [ R* – R0]. This should not interpreted so 
that because Ω > 1 the wealth of the forest-owner decreases in the 
long run as a consequence of a positive shock. Instead, we should 
compare debt with the market value of reserves. This value V is the 
present (discounted) value of sales revenue at time 0 or 
 
 
                     ∞                     
          V   =   ∫ w(t)σR(t)e -i*tdt                                      (20) 
                     0                       
 
 
As an example consider a competitive situation where wood price 
increases from w1 to w2. This leads to an instantaneous increase in 
reserves from R1* to R2*. The value of reserves R2* at wood price w2  
is, from Eq.(20) and applying Eq. (9''),  
 
 
                       ∞                     
          V2   =   ∫ w2 σR2*e -i*tdt                                   
                     0     
 
                  = w2 σR2*/i*  =  (1+h(R2*))R2*                 
 
 
Correspondingly, the value of reserves R1* at price w1 is 
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                       ∞                     
          V1   =   ∫ w1σR1*e -i*tdt  = w1σR1*/i*  =  (1+h(R1*))R1*                  
                      0         
  
               
The cost of the instantaneous reserves increase from R1* to R2* may 
be shown to be 
 
 
                      R2* 
        C    =   ∫ (1 + h(R))dR    = (1+h(ξ))(R2* - R1*)                  
                     R1* 
 
where R1* < ξ  <  R2*. Because there is no transitional dynamics this 
is equal to (instantaneous) debt increase, that is, C =  B2* - B1*. The 
forest owner spends the increase in income flow, w2 σR2* - w1 σR1*, 
on interest payments an consumption flow. The increase in net wealth 
is V2 - V1 - (B2* - B1*). Inserting the corresponding values we obtain 
the wealth  increase as 
 
 
           (1+h(R2*))R2* - (1+h(R1*))R1* - (1+h(ξ))(R2* - R1*) 
 
           =[ h(R2*) - h(ξ)] R2* + [h(ξ) - h(R1*)]R1*  
 
 
This is positive because R1* < ξ < R2* and h(R) is an increasing 
function. 
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               6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
If the forest-owner has some monopoly power in selling wood she 
finds it advantageous in case of an increase in wood demand to divide 
her investments in new resources over time. Her indebtedness follows 
the same pattern, that is, it increases over time. Her wood sales 
increase over time while their unit price decreases. Her income 
increases which she spends on higher consumption and higher interest 
payments. In contrast, if wood market is competitive, within the model 
I have applied an increase in exogenous wood price leads to an 
instantaneous increase in reserves which is financed by borrowing.  
 
 
 
As mentioned in Introduction a standard way to introduce transitional 
dynamics into a Ramsey- type model in a competitive framework is to 
assume installation costs which increase with the size of investment 
flow. Here it is non-competitiveness which causes transitional 
dynamics. Why is it so? For illustration, let us consider a situation 
where investment is done as a consequence of an upward shift in 
exogenous wood price. Assume that here there are two alternatives 
only: either all new (profitable) investment is done at once (time 0) or 
it is divided in two parts, the first part at time 0 and the second part at 
time 1. The nominal investment costs are equal in both cases as was 
shown. Also, all investment at time 0 is financed by borrowing. From 
this it follows that in the second alternative there are smaller interest 
cost between time 0 and time 1 of that part of loan which is 
investment-induced. Notice, however, that because consumption 
jumps up at time 0 there may be borrowing to finance higher 
consumption between times 0 and 1 in this second alternative where 
the revenue flow is smaller than in the first alternative. So the effect of 
interest costs may be ambiguous but these costs are likely to be larger 
in the first alternative. What is unambiguous is that, in the second 
alternative, the producer must give up a part of sales revenue between 
time 0 and time 1 which would have been made possible by the 
additional production capacity created if all investment would have 
been made at time 0. As was shown in the competitive situation it is 
advantageous to do all investment at once as compared with any 
situation where investment is divided over time. If we introduce non- 
competitiveness the decisive factor is obviously sales revenue. Now in 
the first alternative sales revenue would grow proportionally less than 
 15 
sales quantity because of the price fall. This may well make the second 
alternative more advantageous. What was shown in my analysis is that 
dividing investment over time really is more advantageous.  
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APPENDIX  
 
SEC.2: TRANSVERSALITY CONDITIONS are fulfilled: 
 
Optimality requires the following transversality conditions: 
 
              lim H = 0  
              t→∞ 
           
              lim -µe
-i*t
 = 0  
              t→∞ 
           
              lim µq e
- i*t
 = 0  
            t→∞ 
 
 
H = { u(c)- µ [ i*B + c + (1+h(R))I  - pAß(σR)
ß
 ]+µq I } e
-i*t 
(monopoly) 
 
H = { u(c)- µ [ i*B + c + (1+h(R))I  - w(R)σR ]+µq I } e
-i*t          
(general) 
 
H = { u(c)- µ [ i*B + c + (1+h(R))I  - wσR ]+µq I } e
-i*t          
(competitive) 
 
 
Because µ and c are constant and I* = 0, the conditions are fulfilled if  
 
              lim Re
- i*t
 = 0 
              t→∞ 
           
              lim B e
- i*t
 = 0  
              t→∞ 
           
              lim q e
- i*t
 = 0  
              t→∞ 
 
 
Because R*, B* and q* are finite the conditions are fulfilled. 
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SEC. 3: 
 
 
In the steady state of the general case 
 
 
    i*q*  =  -  w*σ - w'(R*)σR* 
  
   = i*(1+h(R*))                                                       
 
 
Differentiating this, 
 
 
- σ   -   (∂w'/∂R*)(∂R*/∂w)σR* -  w'(R*)σ(∂R*/∂w) 
 
      = i*(∂h(R*)/∂R*)(∂R*/∂w)  from which 
 
 
         ∂R*/∂w =   σ / [-w''σR*- w'σ +i*h'(R*)]     
 
         
 
SEC. 4: 
 
From Eq. (6c) 
 
          d(-µe
-i*t
)/dt = [d(-µ)/dt] e
-i*t
 +  µi*e
i*t
  = - (∂H/∂B) = µi*e
i*t
    
             
 
From this, dµ/dt = 0. The fourth condition is: 
 
           d [µqe
-i*t 
] /dt   = µe
-i*t
 (dq/dt) +  q d(µe
-i*t
)/dt   
 
           = µe
-i*t
 (dq/dt) -  qi*µe
-i*t
     =  - (∂H/∂R)  where 
                   
 -(∂H/∂R) =   µ [ - pAß
2
σ
ß
 R
ß-1  + h'(R)I ]e
-i*t
 if  monopoly (Eq.(6d) 
 
-(∂H/∂R) = µ [- wσ  - w'σR + h'(R)I] e
-i*t
 if general, w = w(R) (6d') 
 
 -(∂H/∂R) = µ [- wσ + h'(R)]e
-i*t
           if competitive  (6d'') 
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Dividing by µe
-i*t 
yields 
 
dq/dt = i*q  - pAß
2
σ
ß
 R
ß-1   +  h'(R)I if monopoly (Eq. (8)) 
 
dq/dt = i*q  - wσ  - w' σR    +  h'(R)I if general  (Eq. (8')) 
 
dq/dt = i*q  - wσR  +  h'(R)I if competitive  (Eq. (8'')) 
 
 
Linearizing these, 
 
 Monopoly: dq/dt   = i*q   - pAß
2
σ
ß
 R*
-(1-ß)  
 
+ pA(1-ß)ß
2
 σ
ß 
R*
-(2-ß)
 [R-R*]+ I* h’(R*) + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*]  
 
               +  I* h''(R*)[R-R*]    
 
 
General: dq/dt   =  i*q  -  w*σ  - w'(R*)σR*  
 
                          
 
- [2w'(R*)σ + w''(R*)σR*][R-R*] 
 
                     + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*] 
 
                      + I* h’(R*) + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*]  
 
                      +  I* h''(R*)[R-R*]    
 
 
Competitive:  dq/dt   =  i*q  -  w*σ   + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*] 
 
                      + I* h’(R*) + Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*]  
 
                      +  I* h''(R*)[R-R*]    
 
Because I* = 0, these are as presented in text 
 
Linearizing Eq. (2b) yields 
 
         dR/dt =   I* + Iq(q-q*) = Iq(q*)(q-q*)  
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SEC.5: FOREIGN DEBT  
 
 
 In the monopoly case: 
 
 
dB/dt  =  c  + i*B  -  wσR +   I . (1+h(R))   (use Eqs. (6b) and (7)) 
 
=  w*σ R*- i*B*    + i*B  - wσR      + I . (1+h(R)) (use Eq.(4)) 
 
= i*B - i*B* + pAß(σR*)
ß
 - pAß(σR )
ß   + qI (linearize) 
 
=    i*B - i*B* + pAß(σR*) 
ß
 - pß(σR*)
ß
 - pAß 
2 
σ 
ß  R*
ß-1 
(R(t) – R*)  
 
       + q* Iq (q-q*) (use Eq. (15) and Eq. (16)) 
 
=  i*B - i*B*   -  pAß 
2 
σ 
ß  R*
ß-1
 (R0 - R*)e
vt 
  +  q*v (R0 - R*)e
vt 
 
 
= i*B – i*B* -  ßw*σ(R0 - R*)e
vt 
+ q*v (R0 - R*)e
vt
 
 
 
 
Solving this first-degree differential equation yields 
 
B(t) = Me
i*t
+ e
i*t ∫[  – i*B*] e-i*t dt 
 
 
       + e
i*t ∫[ [- ßw*σ  + q*v][R0 – R*] e-i*t + vt dt 
 
 
   =    Me
i*t
 + B* + [- ßw*σ 
 
+ q*v][1/(v – i*)]
 
[ R0 – R*] e
vt
 
  
=    Me
i*t
   + B* + Ω [ R0 – R*] e
vt 
  
 
where  Ω  = [- ßw*σ 
 
 + q*v][ [1/(v – i*)]. From Eq. (9), Ω = q* = 
(1+h(R*). Setting t = 0 yields 
 
 20 
M = B(0) – B* 
 
 -  Ω [ R0 – R*] 
 
Setting M into the equation above and dividing by e
i*t
 yields 
 
B(t)e
–i*t
 = B(0) – B* 
 
 - Ω [R0 – R*] 
 
                 +  B* e
-i*t
 + Ω [R0 – R*] e
vt-i*t 
 
 
Letting t approach infinity and applying the transversality conditions 
yields 
 
          0
 
= B(0) – B* - Ω [ R0 – R*]  = M 
 
 
Inserting this into the equation above yields 
 
            B(t) = B*  +  Ω [ R0 – R*] e
v t
  
 
From this, 
 
            B(0) = B*  +  Ω [ R0 – R*]  and so  
 
 
          ∂B*/∂A = Ω [∂R*/∂A]  >  0  etc. 
 
 
In the general case: 
 
 
dB/dt  =  c  + i*B  -  wσR +   I . (1+h(R))   (use Eq. (7)) 
 
=  w*σ R*- i*B*    + i*B  - wσR      + I . (1+h(R)) ( use Eq.(6b)) 
 
= i*B - i*B* + w*σR* -  wσR    + qI (linearize) 
 
=    i*B - i*B* + w*σR* - w*σR* -  [w*σ + w'(R*)σR*] (R(t) – R*)  
 
       + q* Iq (q-q*) (use Eq. (15) and Eq. (16)) 
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=  i*B - i*B*   -  [w*σ + w'(R*)σR*](R0 - R*)e
vt 
  +  q*v (R0 - R*)e
vt 
 
 
= i*B – i*B* -  i*q*(R0 - R*)e
vt 
+ q*v (R0 - R*)e
vt
 (using (9')) 
 
 
Solving this first-degree differential equation yields 
 
B(t) = Me
i*t
+ e
i*t ∫[  – i*B*] e-i*t dt 
 
       + e
i*t ∫[ [- i*q* + q*v][R0 – R*] e-i*t + vt dt 
 
   =    Me
i*t
 + B* + [- i*q* + q*v][1/(v – i*)]
 
[ R0 – R*] e
vt
 
  
=    Me
i*t
   + B* + q* [ R0 – R*] e
vt  
(use (9')) 
 
=    Me
i*t
   + B* + (1+h(R*)) [ R0 – R*] e
vt 
 
  
The rest is as with monopoly. 
 
 
 
OVERALL INVESTMENT COSTS: 
 
Costs of investing R* – R are 
 
(Rs – Rs-1)(1+hs) + (Rs-1 – Rs-2)(1+hs-1) + ….. 
 
Letting the division approach zero this is equal to 
 
 R* 
∫ (1 + h(R))dR  
R0 
 
Which is equal to (1+h(ξ))(R*-R0)  by intermediate theorem where R0 
< ξ < R*. 
